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The financial stability implications of increased  




Deepening economic and financial integration between emerging and advanced economies 
has become one of the salient features of global economic developments over the past 
decade. It has manifested itself, among other ways, in the recent surge in private capital 
flows from advanced economies to emerging markets, but also in the reverse flows of capital 
from emerging market countries running large external surpluses to some advanced 
economies and developing countries. Along with many economic and financial benefits, 
increased capital flows have brought with them considerable policy challenges.  
This paper examines some key financial stability challenges of increased capital flows for 
emerging market economies. It focuses in particular on the implications of, and policy 
responses to, increased cross-border banking flows. These financial stability issues have 
received less attention than the macroeconomic implications of capital flows (such as 
exchange rate appreciation and internal and external imbalances) and standard policy 
responses to these challenges (greater exchange rate flexibility, sterilisation, etc). 
To set the stage for the subsequent discussion of financial stability issues, Section 1 
examines some stylised facts on recent trends in capital flows to emerging market countries. 
The trends in gross inflows and outflows of private capital clearly point to growing financial 
integration of emerging market economies with the rest of the world. The trends in net inflows 
suggest a build-up of moderate macroeconomic pressures in Asia and Latin America, and 
very large pressures in central and eastern Europe. Of particular interest to financial stability 
are the large increases in gross inflows of investments to banks and the non-bank private 
sector, and in gross outflows to debt securities. The latter have been part of the recent 
phenomenon of “recycling” of capital inflows by emerging market economies, in which 
institutional investors such as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds are increasingly 
playing an important role.  
Section 2 examines how cross-border banking flows affect some key risks to financial 
stability in emerging markets. The analysis is selective rather than exhaustive. First, the risks 
stemming from cross-border banking flows in the emerging markets with a significant 
presence of foreign-owned banks are examined. It is argued that the solvency risk is 
generally lower in such markets, but the credit risk and the potential for capital flow volatility 
and cross-border contagion are higher. Second, financial stability risks emanating from 
increased investment by non-residents and foreign-owned financial institutions in foreign 
exchange and money markets of selected EMEs are examined.  
Section 3 concludes with a review of policy responses to these risks. These responses have 
involved not only general macroeconomic and financial market reforms, but also the 
strengthening of a whole range of prudential regulations and banking supervision in general. 
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1.  Recent trends in emerging market capital flows 
Definitions and data 
Most of the literature on capital flows to emerging market countries analyses net flows, which 
indicate how large the balance of external funds that enter or leave an economy is. While the 
composition of net capital flows matters for financial stability, net flows per se are primarily 
important from the macroeconomic (ie demand) management perspective rather than the 
financial stability perspective.  
As this paper discusses the financial stability consequences of capital flows it will focus 
mainly on gross inflows and outflows of capital. Gross capital flows are important on at least 
three grounds: first, as a measure of financial integration between emerging and advanced 
economies; second, as a source of information for macroeconomic analysis; and third, as a 
key source of information for financial stability analysis. For instance, gross inflows and 
outflows could be more or less balanced in terms of size, leading one to conclude that capital 
flows raise no major macroeconomic or financial stability issues. However, whether gross 
inflows and outflows are each equivalent to 1% or to 20% of GDP is not inconsequential for 
macroeconomic and financial stability. The flows of private capital of 20% of GDP are bound 
to affect the domestic financial system and the economy, even though in net terms the funds 
that stay in the country might not appear exceptionally large. Balanced net flows might also 
conceal major discrepancies in terms of the composition (eg, FDI vs portfolio and other 
investments; debt vs equity flows) and other characteristics of capital flows (eg maturity and 
currency composition). Therefore, from the financial stability perspective it is essential to 
analyse gross and not just net capital flows. 
The paper will focus on private as opposed to official flows of capital. Over the past decade, 
private capital flows have clearly come to dominate official flows in all emerging markets 
(Appendix Table A3), including those with less developed financial markets such as Africa.  
The period examined is mostly 2001–07, with some comparisons made to capital flows in the 
1990s. The country groupings used in the paper are emerging Asia (China, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand); Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela); and central and eastern Europe (CEE: 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia and Turkey). The aggregate for all emerging market economies also 
includes, in addition to these countries, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.  
The main data source is detailed country balance of payments data in IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). Gross private capital inflows and outflows are added up item by 
item (rather than derived as a difference between current account balances, change in 
reserves and official flows, as is often the case in the literature) and flows involving the 
official sector (government and monetary authorities) are excluded.
2 Data for 2007 are 
mainly estimates from the IMF’s April 2008 World Economic Outlook. Data on cross-border 
loans come from the BIS locational banking statistics.  
The data are mostly analysed by emerging market regions rather than by individual 
countries. Because of the focus on financial stability issues, the paper considers not only 
total regional capital flows but also averages for countries within each region (equation 1). 
The former is useful from the global economy (or global investment) perspective, for 
instance, when considering global flows of capital (or opportunities for diversification) and 
associated imbalances. The latter is useful as an indicator of the effects of capital flows on 
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an average country in the region. For this reason, regional averages are not weighted by the 
size of the economy.
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Size and composition of gross capital inflows 
The recent wave of gross inflows of private capital to the emerging market economies started 
around 2002 and accelerated in the past two to three years (Graph 1). In emerging Asia, 
gross private capital inflows averaged almost 15% of GDP in 2007 (top right-hand panel). 
This was 5 percentage points higher than before the 1997–98 crisis, even though the region 
is now running a large current account surplus. In Latin America, gross private inflows picked 
up from 1% of GDP in 2002 to almost 6% on average in 2007 (bottom left-hand panel), about 
3 percentage points below the historical peaks from the early 1990s. In CEE, opportunities 
created by accession to the European Union have boosted gross private capital inflows to 
over 20% of GDP on average in recent years (bottom right-hand panel), an unprecedented 
level for EMEs in recent history. As a result, this region now receives around 26% of gross 
private capital inflows to emerging markets (compared with around 11% in the mid-1990s); 
Latin America receives around 12% (against 29%); emerging Asia 47% (against 51%); and 
other emerging markets around 19% (against 9%). 
The latest surge in gross private capital inflows has been for the most part due to FDI and 
other investment inflows, which increased by a cumulative $1.5 trillion and $1.2 trillion, 
respectively, between 2002 and 2007 (Graph 2). Portfolio inflows increased by a cumulative 
of $0.9 trillion over the same period. As a result, the share of FDI in gross inflows has 
dropped since the start of the decade to around 30% of the total in 2007, while the shares of 
portfolio and other investment inflows have increased considerably, to 32% and 38%, 
respectively (Graph 3).  
What is special about the current wave of gross capital inflows to EMEs, compared to the 
previous ones, is that it is taking place against the background of much stronger external 
current account positions (with the exception of CEE) and the accompanying substantial 
accumulation of official foreign exchange reserves. For instance, the aggregate current 
account balance of EMEs switched from a deficit of around $60 billion per year on average 
during 1990–97 to a surplus of over $500 billion in 2007 (Appendix Table A1). During 
1990–97, EMEs accumulated on average around $55 billion per year in official reserves, 
while in 2007 alone their reserves increased by over $1 trillion. One consequence of this 
huge increase in reserves has been a sharp increase in gross capital outflows from EMEs. 
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Graph 2 
Gross private capital inflows to emerging market economies 
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Composition of gross private capital inflows 




























































1  Negative numbers indicate a decrease in foreign ownership of domestic assets classified as other investment 
inflows. 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook; author’s estimates.  
Size and composition of gross capital outflows 
As in the case of private capital inflows, the surge in private capital outflows started around 
2002 and accelerated in the past two to three years (Graph 1). The change has been 
particularly pronounced in emerging Asia, where gross capital outflows increased by a 
cumulative $1  trillion in the past three years alone, reaching over $500 billion in 2006 
(Appendix Table A2). In Latin America and CEE, gross outflows increased by a cumulative 
$260 billion and $180 billion, respectively, since 2005, reaching around $105  billion and 
$55  billion, respectively, in 2007 (Appendix Table A2). Relative to GDP, gross capital 
outflows now exceed previous historical peaks in all three regions; they range from 3% of 
GDP on average in Latin America and CEE, to almost 8% of GDP in emerging Asia 
(Graph 1). 
The surge in gross capital outflows has been mostly due to outflows to foreign debt 
securities, which increased by a cumulative $800 billion since 2002 (Graph 4, left-hand 
panel). FDI outflows increased by a cumulative $520 billion over this period; other investment 
outflows to banks by a cumulative $350 billion and to the non-bank private sectors by 
$630 billion; and outflows to equities by a cumulative $190 billion. Private investors from Asia 
accounted for most of the increase in all categories of private capital outflows from EMEs.  
Unlike gross capital inflows, the composition of gross capital outflows has become less 
balanced over time. The share of FDI fell to less than a quarter of gross outflows, from close 
to 40% in 2001 (Graph 5, left-hand panel); the share of equity fell to around 8% of the total 
(centre panel); and that of other investment outflows to banks to 15% (right-hand panel). The 
share of portfolio debt outflows increased at the same time to 40% of gross outflows from 
EMEs. From the financial stability perspective, the more balanced composition of other 
investment outflows is probably a positive development, given how skewed toward the non-
bank sectors these outflows were in the past (Graph 5, right-hand panel). The growing 
imbalance between debt and equity portfolio outflows might be more of a mixed blessing, 
however, as it may reflect the use of capital controls and an increase in quasi-official flows 
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The regional distribution of capital outflows has not changed as much as that of inflows since 
the mid-1990s. Emerging Asia still accounts for roughly one half of total private capital 
outflows from EMEs, Latin America for 13%, CEE for 9% and other EMEs in this sample for 
28%.  
All in all, trends in gross inflows and outflows of private capital over the past few years clearly 
point to growing financial integration of emerging market economies. What merits attention 
from the financial stability viewpoint is especially the large increase in inflows to emerging 
market banks and the non-bank private sector, and the large increase in outflows to foreign 
debt securities.  
Graph 5 
Composition of gross private capital outflows 



















































1    Negative numbers indicate a decrease in domestic ownership of foreign assets classified as other 
investment outflows. 
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Trends in net capital inflows 
As noted above, what matters for macroeconomic management is primarily trends in net 
capital inflows, ie any balance of gross inflows and outflows of capital that influences 
aggregate demand. With the exception of central and eastern Europe, the broad picture of 
recent trends appears reasonably reassuring in this regard: relative to GDP, net capital 
inflows to emerging Asian and Latin American countries were on average close to zero in 
recent years (Graph 6). In CEE countries, however, net inflows of private capital reached 
14% of GDP on average in 2007 (Graph 6, right-hand panel), generating massive pressures 
in local financial markets and the real economy. 
Graph 6 
Net inflows of private capital to emerging market economies  
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Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook; author’s estimates.  
That net inflows in emerging Asia are close to balance despite very large gross inflows is 
mainly the consequence of record high outflows of portfolio capital. In 2007, emerging Asian 
countries thus had on average a “surplus” of 1.6% of GDP in net FDI inflows, offset by 
“deficits” of –0.8% each in net portfolio and other investment inflows (Graph 7, left-hand 
panel). Latin American countries also had positive net FDI inflows (2.4% of GDP on 
average), offset by negative net inflows of portfolio and other investment capital (Graph 7, 
centre panel). In CEE countries, net inflows of FDI amounted to 5.6% of GDP on average in 
2007, and net other investment inflows to as much as 9.7% of GDP on average (Graph 7, 
right-hand panel). Only net portfolio inflows were negative (around –1.4% of GDP on 
average).  
Net inflows of FDI have been relatively stable in all three emerging market regions since 
2001 (Graph 7). However, net portfolio inflows have been subject to reversals. Net other 
investment inflows decreased over time in Asia and Latin America, but increased significantly 
in CEE, raising a number of financial stability issues that are discussed below. 
In sum, recent trends would suggest that macroeconomic pressures stemming from net 
inflows of private capital are low in Asia and Latin America, but very large in CEE. However, 
as noted above, behind the low net flows in Asia and Latin America are often hidden very 
large gross flows, which do raise a number of macroeconomic and financial stability issues. 
Of particular interest would seem to be large net inflows of other investment to banks and the 
non-bank private sectors in emerging Asia and in particular in CEE, and huge portfolio debt 18  BIS Papers No 44 
 
 
and equity outflows from emerging Asia. The next two subsections examine developments in 
cross-border banking flows and in portfolio outflows from emerging market countries. 
Graph 7 
Composition of net inflows of private capital 
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Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook; author’s estimates.  
Cross-border banking flows  
The balance of payments data on capital flows are highly aggregated and include, among 
items that are of interest for this paper, money market and negotiable instruments as part of 
portfolio debt flows; and cross-border loans, trade credit and transactions in currency and 
deposits as part of other investment flows. In addition, financial derivatives assets and 
liabilities are shown as a separate item. However, given their limited statistical coverage in 
EMEs, the financial derivatives flows will not be analysed separately in this paper.  
Money market instruments comprise a small and relatively stable proportion of portfolio flows in 
Asia and CEE (around 2% of gross portfolio inflows, respectively outflows, in the past few years). 
In Latin America, however, they accounted for 20–50% of gross portfolio inflows (respectively, 
outflows). This issue is potentially important for financial stability; however, it is not pursued in this 
paper because it would need to be analysed at a disaggregated country level. 
Other investment flows consist for the most part of trade credit and cross-border loans on the 
gross inflows side (Graph 8, left-hand panel), and trade credit and currency and deposits on 
the gross outflows side (right-hand panel). To obtain better insight into trends in cross-border 
banking flows over time, it is useful to look at the BIS locational banking statistics.
4  
Cross-border claims of BIS reporting banks on EMEs considered in this paper were 
estimated at $2.3 trillion in 2007 (Table 1), an increase of $1.4 trillion over the past five 
years. While emerging Asia and CEE secured the bulk of these inflows, relative to GDP they 
were much more important in the latter case, with the ratio of cross-border claims to GDP 
doubling to 32% between 2002 and 2007. The CEE countries are thus exposed to significant 
risks from a possible reversal in bank-intermediated capital flows. By contrast, cross-border 
loans decreased in Latin America by 4% of regional GDP in the past five years. While in Asia 
these flows increased slightly (by 2% of regional GDP), relative to the 1990s they were 
significantly lower. 
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Table 1 
External positions of BIS reporting banks 
vis-à-vis emerging market countries 
Amount outstanding 
USD billions  Per cent of GDP 
 
1998  2002 2007 1998 2002 2007 
Emerging markets
1            
Vis-à-vis all sectors  1,017  865  2,290  19.3  14.6  17.3 
Vis-à-vis non-bank private sector  366  354  914  6.9  6.0  6.9 
Asia
2         
Vis-à-vis all sectors  574  442  1,068  26.6  14.7  16.9 
Vis-à-vis non-bank private sector  105  87  270  4.9  2.9  4.3 
Latin America
3         
Vis-à-vis all sectors  263  233  350  13.9  15.1  11.1 
Vis-à-vis non-bank private sector  170  156  213  9.0  10.1  6.8 
Central and eastern Europe
4         
Vis-à-vis all sectors  82  118  579  12.1  16.5  32.4 
Vis-à-vis non-bank private sector  44  70  289  6.5  9.8  16.2 
Assets of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis individual emerging market countries; end of period. Totals for positions 
in US dollars; simple averages for positions as a percentage of GDP. 
1    Sum of the regions below, plus Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.       
2    China, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.    
3  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.   
4  Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey. 
Sources: IMF; BIS locational banking statistics. 
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Very large external positions of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis CEE countries clearly represent 
a potential source of external vulnerability. Not surprisingly, some analysts (eg Sorsa et al 
(2007)) have started to draw parallels with the experience of Latin American and emerging 
Asian countries, which had also run up large bank-intermediated external debt in the 1980s. 
An important difference is that, unlike that of Latin America in the 1980s and emerging Asia 
in the 1990s, the external borrowing of CEE countries is taking place against the background 
of a process of rapid economic and financial integration with the European Union, which acts 
as a “convergence club” for this region (see Herrmann and Winkler (2008)). In addition, as 
discussed in Section 2, banking systems in CEE are for the most part foreign-owned and 
highly competitive. By contrast, in Latin America and emerging Asia, the expansion of cross-
border credit was taking place in an environment of, for the most part, financially repressed 
banking systems (and, in Latin America, as part of import-substitution development policies).  
The split of cross-border claims between bank and non-bank sectors differs across EME 
regions. In CEE, the BIS reporting banks have roughly equal claims vis-à-vis banks and the 
non-bank private sector (Table 1). In Latin America, claims against the non-bank sector are 
somewhat higher (60% vs 40%), while in emerging Asia 75% of cross-border claims are held 
against banks. In all three regions, cross-border claims vis-à-vis banks increased over the 
past three years, in CEE by a cumulative of 7.5% of GDP (Graph 9, left-hand panel). The 
increase in cross-border claims vis-à-vis the non-bank private sector was not as pronounced 
(Graph 9, right-hand panel).  
Graph 9 
Cross-border claims of BIS reporting banks 
vis-à-vis emerging markets 
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Source: BIS, Locational Banking Statistics; IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
Cross-border loans play an important role in total bank credit in emerging market countries. 
In 2007, cross-border loans accounted for 15% of total bank credit (ie, domestic and external 
bank loans) in emerging Asia, 22% in Latin America and as much as 37% in CEE 
(Graph  10). In Latin America, the importance of cross-border loans has decreased 
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Sources: IMF; national data; BIS locational banking statistics. 
Foreign assets of emerging market economies 
Faced with macroeconomic pressures resulting from very large net capital inflows, many 
emerging market countries have started “recycling” the inflows more actively in recent years 
by acquiring foreign assets. The gross foreign assets of the EMEs considered in this paper 
were estimated at about $5.8 trillion at the end of 2006, equivalent to about 54% of their 
combined GDP (Table 2). They have increased by $4 trillion (11% of combined GDP) since 
2001, with Asian economies accounting for two thirds of the increase. Gross foreign assets 
of EMEs were almost equally split between official foreign exchange reserves (47%) and 
private sector assets (53%) in 2006.  
Gross foreign assets increased at a measured pace over the past five years, while gross 
foreign liabilities declined significantly between 2001 and 2004, and subsequently levelled off 
(Graph 11, left-hand panel). This resulted in net foreign liabilities of 12% of GDP in 2006, 
compared with 27% in 2001.  
On a regional level, emerging Asia became a net holder of foreign assets (to the tune of 7% 
of regional GDP in 2006, compared with –19% in 2001), and Latin America significantly 
reduced its net foreign liabilities (to 29% of regional GDP in 2006), while CEE increased its 
net foreign liabilities to almost 50% of GDP (Table 2). 
Excluding official foreign reserve assets (for which no breakdown by type of asset is 
available), the bulk of foreign assets of EMEs were other investment assets (ie, investments 
in foreign banks and the non-bank private sector) and outward FDI (Graph 11, right-hand 
panel). As suggested by the data in Graph 8 (right-hand panel), the former comprise for the 
most part currency and deposits held in banks abroad and trade credit extended to non-




Foreign assets of emerging market economies
1 
USD billions  Per cent of GDP   
2001 2004 2006 2001 2004 2006 
Emerging market countries
2         
Gross foreign assets     1,828  3,768  5,794  43  49  54 
Official FX reserves  605  1,737  2,689  14  23  25 
Private sector assets  1,221 2,024 3,095  29  26  29 
Direct investment abroad  294  541  898  7  7  8 
Portfolio investment abroad  152  383  755  4  5  7 
Debt  securities  75 241 479  2  3  5 
Equity  securities  77 142 276  2  2  3 
Other investments abroad  775 1,100 1,442  18  14  14 
Banks
3  186 219 315  4  3  3 
Other sectors
3, 4  278 346 438  7  4  4 
Net foreign assets (net IIP)  –1,126  –1,136  –1,232  –27  –15  –12 
Asia
5         
Gross foreign assets     784  2,201  3,370  56  56  64 
Official FX reserves  324  1,224  1,839  23  31  35 
Private  sector  assets  460  975  1,528  33 25 29 
Direct investment abroad  115  226  327  8  6  6 
Portfolio investment abroad  72  229  487  5  6  9 
Debt  securities  39 169 359  3  4  7 
Equity  securities  33  60  128  2 2 2 
Other investments abroad  273  520  714  19  13  14 
Banks
3  74 76 98 6  4  4 
Other sectors
3, 4  20 28 35 2  2  2 
Net foreign assets (net IIP)  –274  66  353  –19  2  7 
Latin America
6         
Gross foreign assets     512  657  925  29  35  34 
Official FX reserves  144  204  284  8  11  11 
Private  sector  assets  368 452 640 21  24  24 
Direct investment abroad  106  141  220  6  8  8 
Portfolio investment abroad  39  64  117  2  3  4 
Debt  securities  26 32 61 1  2  2 
Equity  securities  13 32 57 1  2  2 
Other investments abroad  222  247  302  13  13  11 
Banks  34 22 30 2  1  1 
Other sectors
4  177 210 253 10  11  9 
Net foreign assets (net IIP)  –660  –686  –786  –37  –37  –29 
Central and eastern Europe
7        
Gross foreign assets     220  389  611  36  36  43 
Official FX reserves  93  170  237  15  16  17 
Private  sector  assets  126 215 368 20  20  26 
Direct investment abroad  11  28  90  2  3  6 
Portfolio investment abroad  10  35  68  2  3  5 
Debt  securities  8 28 43 1  3  3 
Equity  securities  2 7  25  0 1 2 
Other investments abroad  105  152  210  17  14  15 
Banks  56  80  105  9 7 7 
Other sectors
4  32 58 92 5  5  6 
Net foreign assets (net IIP)  –212  –469  –694  –34  –44  –49 
1  Based on international investment position data.    
2  Sum of the regions below, plus Russia and South Africa 
(IIP data for Saudi Arabia are not available).       
3    Excluding China, Malaysia and Singapore, for which no 
breakdown of other investment assets is available (only the totals).    
4  Comprises non-financial corporations 
(private and public), insurance companies, pension funds, other non-depository financial intermediaries and 
households.    
5  India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and, from 2004, China.    
6  Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.       
7    Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey. 
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The share of FDI in gross foreign assets of the private sector increased to 29% in 2006 (from 
24% in 2001), that of portfolio assets doubled to 24%, and the share of other investment 
outflows decreased to 47% (from 63%). The composition of the foreign asset portfolio seems 
to be most balanced in Asia (Graph 12). In Latin America and CEE, it is skewed towards 
outward FDI investments in foreign banks. 
Graph 12 
 
Composition of foreign assets by EME regions 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
Of particular interest for financial stability is the increase in EME private sector holdings of 
foreign debt securities, which totalled about $400 billion since 2001 (Table 2 and Graph 11, 
right-hand panel). Private investors from Asia, and China in particular, accounted for the bulk 
of this increase (almost $140 billion in the case of China). A notable feature of this 
development is that a large share of these “private” investors are actually state-controlled 
entities – in China, for instance, such investors include large commercial banks which, while 
classified as private investors in official statistics, remain majority state-owned. 24  BIS Papers No 44 
 
 
Another class of notionally “private” investors from emerging market economies who have 
contributed to capital outflows are sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), which can be defined 
as all government-owned asset pools except traditional monetary reserves and pension 
funds (Rozanov (2008)). SWFs can be grouped according to several criteria, including 
motives for their establishment, sources of funding and uses of their resources (see Mihaljek 
(2008)). Because relatively little is known about some funds (especially the largest ones), 
there are no reliable estimates of their size, let alone their growth. Moreover, it is not clear 
how these funds are classified in official statistics – as official or private investors.  
While the combined size of sovereign wealth funds from EMEs can be estimated at around 
$2.3 trillion in 2007 (Appendix Table A4), how large a part of “reverse” flows from EMEs to 
advanced economies originate in sovereign wealth funds, and thus the public sector of 
EMEs, can only be guessed. One well documented figure is that on commitments made by 
SWFs from China, Singapore and several Middle East countries to recapitalise troubled 
financial institutions from Europe and the United States in late 2007 and early 2008. That 
figure – around $80 billion in total – would represent roughly 10% of estimated private sector 
capital outflows from emerging market countries in 2007. If all assets managed by SWFs 
from emerging markets were invested abroad, they would account for 40% of foreign assets 
held by the public and private sectors of EMEs in 2006 (or 74% of foreign assets held by the 
private sector of EMEs).
5  
The increase in (notionally) private capital outflows into debt securities has come on top of 
substantial official capital outflows in the form of increases in foreign exchange reserves. In 
emerging Asia, official reserves rose by an average of 4–6% of GDP annually in recent 
years; in Latin America by slightly under 2% of GDP per year; and in CEE by 2–3% of GDP 
per year (Table 2).  
As foreign reserves are also believed to be mainly invested in debt securities, particularly 
those of advanced economies, the combined private and official outflows into foreign debt 
securities probably account for three quarters of gross capital outflows from emerging 
markets. In view of the recent volatile exchange rate movements and in particular the sharp 
depreciation of the US dollar, the large holdings of foreign debt securities denominated in 
depreciating currencies expose the emerging market investors – including central banks and 
SWFs – to considerable valuation losses. While this is an important issue from the financial 
stability perspective, it will not be pursued further in this paper. The focus of the remaining 
discussion will be instead on bank-intermediated capital flows. 
2. Financial  stability  challenges  of increased capital flows  
Following the crises of the 1980s and the 1990s, the literature has devoted considerable 
attention to the macroeconomic challenges of increased capital flows to emerging market 
economies. These challenges include, among others, currency appreciation pressures; rapid 
growth of domestic bank credit; the expansion of domestic demand and the risk of 
overheating; pressures on consumer prices, wages and asset prices (especially equity and 
property prices); and, in some cases, widening external current account deficits.  
The financial stability consequences of increased capital flows have received less attention 
so far. This section first looks at some risks related to the growth of cross-border banking 
                                                  
5    Calculated as total SWF assets held by EMEs ($2.3 trillion), divided by gross foreign assets of EMEs 
($5.8 trillion for the public and private sectors, or $3.1 trillion for the private sector only). As data on 
international investment positions are not available for most Middle Eastern countries, these estimates 
probably exaggerate the share of SWFs in foreign assets of EMEs.  BIS Papers No 44  25
 
 
flows in EMEs with large presence of foreign-owned financial institutions. Second, it 
examines the risks related to increased capital flows intermediated through foreign exchange 
and money markets of selected EMEs.  
Cross-border banking flows in EMEs with a large foreign bank presence  
The development of financial systems and the growing presence of foreign financial 
institutions in EMEs have greatly expanded the scope of financial intermediation and lowered 
the cost of financial services in emerging markets, particularly in Latin America and central 
and eastern Europe (see Chopra (2007) and Mihaljek (2006)). At the same time, they have 
altered the nature of risks to financial stability by generally lowering the solvency risk but 
increasing the credit risk and the potential for capital flow volatility and cross-border 
contagion.  
The main reason foreign ownership has so far tended to reduce the risk of a traditional 
banking solvency crisis is that foreign owners are generally large, reputable financial 
institutions from advanced economies. These institutions tend to be relatively well managed 
and supervised, and usually have a strong regulatory capital base. Concern about reputation 
risk and relatively centralised management suggest that these institutions are likely to 
support their emerging market subsidiaries with capital or liquidity injections, should these 
run the risk of insolvency or become subject to a bank run (IMF (2007c)).  
One supporting piece of evidence is the absence of any significant bank failure in CEE 
following privatisations to foreign strategic partners in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These 
foreign-owned banks have so far shown resilience in the face of, at times, considerable 
volatility in local financial markets, and despite numerous “early warnings” from various 
macroprudential indicators devised for detecting banking system vulnerabilities. Swedish, 
Austrian and Italian banks with a large presence in the region tend to take a long-term view 
of the growth opportunities in CEE, and have consistently sought to protect their franchises. 
They also tend to focus on traditional commercial banking activities – as a result, they have 
not been affected by the fallout from the latest financial crisis originating in the United States. 
While foreign-owned banking systems might be less prone to a traditional solvency crisis, 
their tendency to underestimate the build-up in credit risk arising from rapid credit 
growth in emerging market economies might be more pronounced than in predominantly 
domestically owned banking systems.  
One set of factors that explain this tendency includes institutional weaknesses such as 
inadequate accounting, auditing, financial reporting and disclosure; the lack of an adequate 
credit bureau or register; and opaque ownership structure of emerging market corporate 
borrowers. For instance, the poor quality of economic and financial data on borrowers in 
many EMEs means that the foreign-owned institutions’ risk management and measurement 
systems, which have been designed for mature financial markets, might not work well in 
many emerging markets. This makes it difficult for parent institutions to estimate reliably 
credit risk or risk-adjusted returns in their subsidiaries, and forces them to rely largely on the 
judgment of local managers. The resulting information asymmetry creates scope for local 
managers to report estimates of credit risk that are too low, so as to make lower provisions 
and report higher return on equity (Craig (2006)).
6  
                                                  
6   One should also mention that the increased volume of loans can easily overstretch the credit assessment and 
monitoring capacity of foreign-owned financial institutions, because experienced bank officers are often in 
short supply in EMEs, and might be particularly hard to find on the labour market during credit booms. 26  BIS Papers No 44 
 
 
The lack of adequate credit risk data might lead creditors to rely more heavily on collateral to 
mitigate risk. However, weaknesses in the legal system can make it difficult to recover 
collateral. This can result, in turn, in an underestimation of expected loss-given-default. 
Another incentive problem specific to foreign-owned institutions that might lead to an 
underestimation of the build-up in credit risk is the structure of managerial compensation. 
Top managers of foreign-owned subsidiaries or branches are often expatriate professionals 
working on fixed-term contracts. During their limited term in a given EME, they have an 
incentive to boost the volume of lending, which is typically used as a criterion for assessing 
the size of their bonus payments. Rapid credit growth can conceal deterioration in credit 
quality because the increase in the share of new loans temporarily depresses reported non-
performing loans. And by the time most of these loans mature and some (or sometimes 
many) turn out to be non-performing, the manager who oversaw the credit expansion in 
country A might be already busy repeating the task in country B or C. 
There are indications that in EMEs with competitive domestically owned banks (such as 
Brazil), local banks can make better judgments about credit risk and provisioning than 
foreign-owned banks (Mihaljek (2006)). They may also face fewer asymmetries with respect 
to incentives for loan growth. 
Foreign-owned banks also tend to engage more readily in carry trades in the presence of 
interest rate differentials and appreciating exchange rates in emerging markets, typically 
channelling foreign currency loans to consumer and mortgage credit so long as the 
uncovered interest rate parity holds. This practice is widespread at the moment in central and 
eastern Europe, and was common in the past in many Asian countries. When borrowers lack 
a hedge against the foreign exchange risk, either because the market for hedging 
instruments is not developed or because of a perception that an exchange rate peg will not 
be allowed to fail, foreign currency lending can result in underpricing of, and/or 
underprovisioning for, foreign exchange risk. Foreign-owned banks also lend in foreign 
currency because the parent bank, or its supervisor, wants to limit the size of the exchange 
rate risk it bears directly. However, this risk is not eliminated by extending foreign currency 
loans; it is merely transformed into indirect credit risk that will materialise if a country is 
forced to devalue as a result of domestic macroeconomic or international financial 
disturbances. 
More generally, greater presence of foreign-owned banks increases the scope for regulatory 
arbitrage between lending via subsidiaries, branches, non-bank financial institutions owned 
by foreign banks or direct-cross border loans. As regulations tend to lag behind the 
sophistication of banks (especially foreign-owned ones), it is very difficult for central banks 
and regulators in EMEs with a large presence of foreign banks to prevent the emergence of a 
credit boom, or, once the boom is under way, to bring it under control on their own, ie without 
the help of foreign bank regulators (discussed below).  
Foreign-owned banking systems might also be more exposed to the risk of a sharp 
slowdown or reversal in bank-intermediated capital flows. This risk could be triggered by 
problems in either the emerging economy host markets or the parent banks’ home market. 
Problems in the host market. Once the underestimation of credit risk in an EME home market 
is recognised, banks have to increase their provisioning. In banking systems dominated by 
foreign-owned banks, the increase in provisioning – and any resulting decrease in credit 
growth – might turn out to be more pronounced. One reason is that foreign financial 
institutions, based on past performance, typically set high targets for return on equity (ROE) 
in emerging markets, usually about 20–25%, thus offsetting the relatively low ROE usually 
earned by parent institutions in their home markets (Table 3). This strategy exploits foreign 
banks’ competitive advantage arising from their strong reputation, technical and operational 
capabilities and relatively low funding costs. However, the ambitious ROE targets often 
assume relatively low provisioning rates, which could reflect an underestimation of credit risk 
or, equivalently, an overestimation of risk-adjusted ROE. When the extent of that BIS Papers No 44  27
 
 
underestimation is recognised and provisioning has to be increased, management could 
conclude that their ambitious ROE targets cannot be met, and that lending growth in a given 
market (or group of EMEs) must be sharply curtailed. 
 
Table 3 
Return on equity for banks  
in major host and home countries, 2005 
 






Asia Indonesia  24.0  Canada  25.4 
  Korea 19.1  Netherlands  16.0 
  Malaysia 14.1  United  Kingdom  17.3 
  Philippines 6.8  United  States  17.7 
  Singapore 11.0     
Latin America  Brazil  27.7  Spain  16.0 
  Chile 17.3  United  Kingdom  17.3 
  Colombia 33.9  United  States  17.7 
  Mexico 24.4     
Central Europe  Czech Republic   32.1  Austria  14.8 
  Hungary 27.0  Belgium    19.2 
  Poland 20.6  France    14.4 
  Slovakia 13.7  Germany    13.9 
  Slovenia 17.0  Italy  14.0 
Baltic states  Estonia  19.4  Denmark  18.9 
  Latvia 25.1  Sweden    20.7 
  Lithuania 16.0  Finland    9.4 
South-eastern Europe  Bulgaria  21.4  Austria  14.8 
  Croatia 20.2  Greece    15.3 
  Romania 14.9  Italy    14.0 
  Turkey 17.8     
Other EMEs  Israel  19.4     
  Russia 24.1     
  South Africa  20.1     
For host countries, ROE refers in most cases to domestic consolidation basis; for home countries, to cross-
border and cross-sector consolidation basis for domestically incorporated banks. For details, see 
www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi.  
Source: IMF, Financial Soundness Indicators database. 
 
This happens frequently when an asset price boom comes to an end. For instance, banks 
operating in EMEs often face risks from large exposures to the property market. If the quality 
of mortgage loans deteriorates because house prices begin to decline, internal risk controls 
at banks could force a sharp reduction in new loans to protect bank capital.  
The impact on capital inflows in such an event would depend on the extent to which credit is 
funded from abroad and the cost of home relative to host market funding. While the extent of 28  BIS Papers No 44 
 
 
foreign funding of domestic credit is fairly large in many emerging markets, particularly in 
CEE (Graph 10), it is considerably lower today in the presence of foreign-owned bank 
subsidiaries than in the past, when reliance on “pure” cross-border credit was much higher, 
particularly in Latin America.  
The cost of medium- and long-term host market funding varies considerably across 
countries, but is often higher than the cost of funding of subsidiaries from their parents, or the 
cost of funding in international wholesale markets. For instance, in CEE the cost of funding 
from parent banks is around Euribor plus 150–200 basis points. Even when interest rates on 
demand and time deposits in host countries are low, their maturity may be too short to allow 
the subsidiaries to satisfy the maturity matching requirements of supervisors, or the 
requirements of their parent banks’ risk management systems. In contrast, parent bank 
treasuries can more easily tailor the maturity of the funding to their subsidiaries’ needs. 
Parent banks may also prefer to fund their subsidiaries because lending margins in host 
country markets tend to be wider than those in home markets. 
Problems in the home market. In view of the turmoil engulfing banks in advanced economies 
since the summer of 2007, the sustainability of bank-intermediated capital inflows would 
seem to be a particularly pronounced vulnerability at the current juncture. A classic example 
is the large-scale withdrawal of Japanese banks from emerging Asia during the 1997–98 
crisis. When Japanese banks experienced problems in their home market as a result of 
declines in equity and real estate prices, they had to shrink their balance sheets to maintain 
their capital adequacy requirements. The resulting pull-back provided a major impetus to the 
crisis that was unfolding in emerging Asia at the time. 
Although the main parent banks in CEE have so far not experienced major losses on US 
subprime mortgages or structured products, they obtain a substantial part of their funding in 
foreign currencies in international wholesale markets. Thus, Swedish banks borrow euros 
and onlend these funds to their subsidiaries in the Baltic states, while Austrian and Italian 
banks borrow in Swiss francs and onlend these funds to their subsidiaries in central and 
southeastern Europe. If these wholesale markets dried up, the main suppliers of external 
financing to emerging Europe would come under funding pressure.
7  
Finally, banking flows to EMEs could diminish because parent banks face liquidity problems 
at home and, in a reversal of the normal pattern of flows, turn to their emerging market 
subsidiaries for funding. There is some anecdotal evidence that parent banks from advanced 
economies used funding from their subsidiaries in emerging markets such as the Czech 
Republic, Mexico and Russia to obtain liquidity in August and September 2007. 
A third set of financial stability risks associated with the large presence of foreign banks is 
the risk of financial contagion. Once the recognition or materialisation of credit risk in one 
country triggers a broader reassessment of risk in the whole region, close financial linkages 
between home and host country institutions can serve as channels for contagion. The 
potential for contagion is greater if financial institutions pursue common strategies across the 
region, as this tends to result in similar types of exposure across countries (see Geršl 
(2007)).  
The potential for contagion partly reflects the centralisation of risk and treasury operations in 
foreign-owned financial groups. Most large international banks operating in emerging 
markets typically monitor risk on a group-wide basis and take strategic decisions in the head 
office. They delegate day-to-day operational decisions to local management in their 
                                                  
7    Alternative sources of bank funding in CEE are currently scarce: domestically owned banks have limited 
capacity to raise funds externally, and even those that do (eg Russian banks) have seen their funding reduced 
since August 2007. Locally, the growth of the deposit base has lagged behind credit growth in most CEE 
countries for several years now, which was why CEE banks started to seek external funding in the first place. BIS Papers No 44  29
 
 
subsidiaries and branches to varying degrees, depending on the bank and country. While 
this centralisation helps ensure efficient allocation of capital and may improve the quality of 
risk management, it also increases the likelihood that the parent company might reduce 
exposures in one country in response to losses at home or elsewhere in the region. This 
effect would be mitigated to the extent that banks have well diversified sources of funding. 
Another factor increasing the probability of contagion risk is the large asymmetry in the 
importance of bilateral credit exposures to host countries and to parent institutions. 
Compared to the host country’s exposure to a particular parent bank, the parent institution’s 
exposure to a host country is typically a much smaller fraction of its regional – not to mention 
worldwide – loan portfolio. Changes in lending policies that are modest from the perspective 
of the parent institution can thus have a major macroeconomic and financial stability impact 
on the host country.  
For instance, Austrian banks’ exposure to individual CEE countries never exceeds 13% of 
their total regional exposure in the aggregate, but for individual countries it can represent well 
over half of total domestic borrowing (Graph 13). This asymmetry exposes small host 
countries to a potentially large decrease in credit supply, even in the case of a relatively 


















































































































































Exposure of all sectors in CEE countries to banks from key home countries1
Each point describes the bilateral exposure of all banks from a home country to all sectors in a CEE host country. For instance, the 
point AT-CZ indicates that the exposure of all sectors in the Czech Republic to Austrian banks represents 27% of total borrowing from 
foreign banks by all sectors in the Czech Republic (horizontal axis), while the Austrian banks’ exposure to all sectors in the Czech 
Republic represents 10% of Austrian banks’ total exposure to CEE (vertical axis). The line represents estimated regression with an 
intercept of 7.5, coefficient of 0.33 and R2 of 0.28. 
1 As a percentage of CEE countries’ total borrowing from foreign banks.    2 As a percentage of home country’s total lending to the CEE 
region.
Source: BIS consolidated banking statistics.




Relative sizes of selected home and 
host country exposures, June 2007 
Each point describes the bilateral exposure of all banks from a home country to all sectors in a CEE host 
country. For instance, the point AT-CZ indicates that the exposure of all sectors in the Czech Republic to 
Austrian banks represents 27% of total borrowing from foreign banks by all sectors in the Czech Republic 
(horizontal axis), while the Austrian banks’ exposure to all sectors in the Czech Republic represents 10% of 
Austrian banks’ total exposure to CEE (vertical axis). The line represents estimated regression with an intercept 
of 7.5, coefficient of 0.33 and R
2 of 0.28. 
1  As a percentage of CEE countries’ total borrowing from foreign banks.    
2  As a percentage of home country’s 
total lending to the CEE region. 
Source: BIS consolidated banking statistics. 30  BIS Papers No 44 
 
 
At the same time, Graph 13 shows that banks from Nordic countries in particular have fairly 
concentrated exposures in the Baltic region. Disturbances in any single host country could 
therefore affect both the home country banks and, through possible contagion, other 
neighbouring host countries.
8 
Cross-border flows to EME foreign exchange and money markets 
Transactions with non-residents in foreign exchange and money markets are difficult to track 
at aggregate EME or regional levels, so this section illustrates the risks that could arise from 
such flows in a few selected country examples. 
Korean banks, in particular the foreign-owned ones, have been actively engaged in covered 
interest parity arbitrage in the past two years.
9 Given the apparently persistent deviation in 
covered interest parity, local branches of foreign banks in Korea have borrowed dollars short-
term, sold these dollars for won to domestic banks on the swap market, and then bought 
domestic bonds, thus generating profits without incurring significant risk. This contributed to 
the rapid increase in short-term external debt and to the fivefold increase, to 16 trillion won 
(about $17 billion), in net buying of Korean treasury bonds and central bank monetary 
stabilisation bonds by local branches of foreign banks in 2006 (IMF (2007b)).  
The hedging activity by Korean shipbuilders and by asset management companies making 
overseas portfolio investments with residents’ funds has significantly contributed to the surge 
in capital inflows. With Korea home to seven of the world’s 10 largest shipbuilding 
companies, it is benefiting greatly from a surge in global trade, oil prices and energy demand. 
Korean shipbuilders only began to hedge their foreign exchange exposure in 2004, and have 
recently increased their hedging ratio to around 60% in anticipation of continued won 
appreciation. Asset management companies meanwhile increased their hedging ratio to 
around 80% in 2007. 
Typically, exporters and asset management companies sell expected dollar receipts forward, 
for the most part to domestic banks, but also to foreign bank branches in Korea. Banks raise 
dollars through buy and sell swap transactions with foreign bank branches or head offices, 
and then sell these dollars on the local spot market to match their own currency exposure, 
thereby creating a capital inflow. Such transactions do not have lasting effects on financial 
stability, however: once exporters have achieved their desired hedging ratios, further hedging 
activity and associated capital inflows are bound to slow. In the short term, however, they 
may have adverse effects such as appreciation of the Korean currency and lowering 
domestic bond yields. 
Foreign investors, foreign-owned banks and the domestic corporate sector in Hungary have 
also generated large capital flows associated with exchange rate arbitrage. Foreign investors 
are active on both the spot and swap markets; they take forward positions using a 
combination of these two markets (as liquidity in the swap market is much greater than that 
in the forward market) and actively use derivative instruments. They are capable of taking on 
large foreign exchange exposure in a short period of time. For instance, in early 2003 foreign 
investors bought more than €5 billion worth of forints in two days, speculating that the 
exchange rate would be officially revalued. In July–August 2007, they sold €5.5 billion worth 
of Hungarian currency as liquidity evaporated in advanced economies. 
                                                  
8   Recent stress tests of the Austrian banking sector’s resilience to shocks suggest that credit risk is adequately 
provided by existing risk provisions in all scenarios examined (Austrian National Bank (2007b)). The stress 
test for indirect credit risk of foreign currency loans yields a reduction of the consolidated capital ratio by 
0.17 percentage points for the Swiss franc and 0.02 percentage points for the Japanese yen loans. 
9    According to covered interest parity, the interest rate difference between two countries should equal the 
difference between the forward and the spot exchange rate between the two currencies. BIS Papers No 44  31
 
 
Hungarian (as well as many other CEE) banks have been actively offering foreign currency 
loans to households and small and medium-sized enterprises, thus significantly changing the 
currency denomination of transactions on the foreign exchange market. For instance, 
structural changes in Hungary’s foreign trade or investment flows cannot explain the increase 
in Swiss franc-denominated transactions from 2% of total spot market turnover in 2001, to 
13% in mid-2007, with a similar change occurring on the swap market.
10 In addition, 
Hungarian exporters have regularly taken on large foreign exchange exposures. Typically, 
they would open long forint forward positions when the forint weakened, and close those 
positions when the currency appreciated. 
In  Thailand, foreign-owned banks have historically accounted for the dominant share of 
foreign exchange transactions. Though most firms in the real sector carry out their spot and 
hedging transactions with Thai banks, the size of these transactions is overwhelmed by 
foreign exchange flows intermediated by foreign-owned banks. These flows include 
derivative products such as structured notes and non-deliverable interest rate swaps. Given 
the absence of a foreign exchange futures market, these products allow foreign investors to 
take positions on the direction of change in Thai interest rates. The growing size of the non-
deliverable interest rate swap market has also affected the prices of bonds, which are used 
to cover investors’ positions. Another concern has been the increase in concentration risk, 
which could develop into liquidity risk, given that foreign institutions frequently take similar 
positions to profit from their views on the exchange rate or the interest rate. 
In Chile, capital outflows have been to a large extent driven by portfolio diversification on the 
part of pension funds, which have been allowed to increase gradually their exposure to 
foreign assets. This has helped develop the market for hedging instruments, as pension 
funds face separate limits on their exposure to exchange rate risk and foreign market risk, 
and are required by law to hedge their foreign exchange risk in the local capital market. 
Pension funds for the most part sell their long forward positions in foreign exchange to the 
local banking system. As banks aim to keep their foreign exchange exposure close to zero, 
they sell the pension funds’ long forward positions to Chilean corporations with future foreign 
exchange commitments. One concern, however, is that hedging instruments are for the most 
part intermediated by foreign-owned banks. Although they represent less than 4% of the total 
assets and less than 10% of the total capital of the Chilean banking sector, foreign banks 
play a large role in the intermediation of capital flows and the provision of hedging 
instruments (Desormeaux et al (2008)). For instance, the derivative position held by foreign 
banks represents more than 70% of the system's total (over $5 billion as of mid-2007). 
3. Policy  responses 
Responses to the macroeconomic challenges of capital inflows 
The emerging market countries have responded to the macroeconomic challenges of the 
recent wave of capital inflows in a variety of ways, depending on the monetary policy 
framework and the specific policy objectives of the authorities. Given that most countries 
maintained some form of exchange rate and/or monetary target, the policy response to the 
inflows aimed in general at addressing the impossible trinity dilemma. As the countries 
liberalised the capital account while integrating with global capital markets, attempts to 
achieve simultaneously (explicit or implicit) inflation and exchange rate targets put a strain on 
                                                  
10  See Király et al (2008). The latest product that has emerged on the retail market is the yen-denominated 
mortgage-backed consumption loan. It accounts for around 10% of new loans, and is being promoted mostly 
by the largest, predominantly domestically owned, commercial bank. 32  BIS Papers No 44 
 
 
the existing mix of monetary and exchange rate policies. Combined with predictable 
exchange rates, the high interest rates needed to reduce inflation attracted capital inflows, 
putting appreciation pressures on the currencies and exchange rate targets. Faced with 
these trade-offs, the policymakers had to choose between affecting the inflows themselves or 
coping with their implications. In many cases, a mix of both approaches was followed. 
One policy response recently adopted by a number of countries has been to allow greater 
exchange rate flexibility. Over the past few years, there has been substantial exchange 
rate appreciation of the currencies in Brazil, Korea, Thailand and much of central Europe. 
Greater exchange rate flexibility can help resolve the tension between various policy targets 
by letting the appreciation absorb the impact of the inflows. In some countries (eg Poland, 
South Africa and Turkey), more flexible rates have also discouraged short-term speculative 
inflows by making sure that market participants face two-way exchange rate risks. However, 
in some other countries (including the Czech Republic, Indonesia and Slovakia), currency 
appreciation seems to have been associated with additional capital inflows, presumably on 
the expectation that the exchange rate would continue to appreciate. 
The adverse implications of exchange rate appreciation for external competitiveness have 
made many emerging market authorities reluctant to allow a significant strengthening of 
domestic currency. Some emerging market countries have also maintained fixed or quasi-
fixed exchange rate regimes, allowing little short-term movement in the exchange rate. To 
support these policies, several central banks intervened on a major scale for several years. 
The consequence has been a substantial increase in foreign exchange reserves in a number 
of countries over the period from 2000 to 2007 (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 
Capital flows and intervention 
In billions of US dollars 
Net capital flows  Current account balance  Change in reserves   
1990–93 1995–96 2000–07 1990–93 1995–96 2000–07 1990–93 1995–96 2000–07
China  35  79 368  20  9 970  4  53  1,374 
India  20  16 230 –17 –12 –20  7  0  235 
Other Asia
1  124 125 –79 –53 –64 510  76  47  441 
Brazil  25 62  144  0  –42 –8 23 21 145 



















1    Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.       
2  Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. 
Sources: IMF; CEIC; national data.  
 
Other things equal, foreign reserve accumulation tends to increase the monetary base and 
ease monetary conditions. In order to prevent such easing, central banks take steps to limit 
or “sterilise” the monetary impact of foreign exchange intervention. Many EMEs have done 
this by issuing debt securities of various maturities (and in some cases, notably in China and 
India, by raising the reserve requirements on banks). Sterilisation is rarely complete, 
however, and some easing in money or credit conditions usually still occurs. During early 
years when they were building reserves, many central banks were deliberately seeking to 
ease monetary policy, given the environment of low inflation and large excess capacity. Real 
short-term interest rates fell significantly, particularly in Asia. In effect, such intervention was BIS Papers No 44  33
 
 
then partly unsterilised, in the sense that central banks tolerated the downward pressure on 
interest rates and monetary expansion.  
But the longer inflows continued, and as inflation risks increased, the degree of sterilisation 
tended to increase. The scale of required domestic liability creation, measured in relation to 
several aggregate yardsticks of the financial economy, has grown substantially as a result 
(Graph 14). Intervention on this scale over many years has had a major impact on the 
balance sheets of central banks and of the banking sectors. The balance sheets of domestic 
commercial banks in many EMEs have expanded dramatically; the liquidity of bank balance 
sheets has increased as bank holdings of government paper have risen, and significant 
financial sector distortions have been created (see Mohanty and Turner (2005)). These 
developments have contributed to the substantial growth of bank credit to the private sector, 
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This updates Graphs 1 and 2 in Mohanty and Turner (2005), which contains further discussion of this calculation. 
1 Simple average of the economies listed.    2 Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.    3 Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
Sources: IMF; national data; BIS.
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Domestic bank credit to the private sector 
In real terms, in per cent per annum 
  1990–99
5  2000–04 2005  2006  2007 
Emerging Asia
1  10.0 11.4 10.1 13.0 12.9 
China  13.9 12.5  7.4 11.2 12.0 
India  4.5 12.5 20.2 18.5 14.7 
Indonesia  1.1 10.0  2.4  6.3 16.7 
Korea 11.2  5.6  5.7  13.8  10.7 
Latin America
1  10.3 –0.5 18.1 26.3 21.0 
Argentina 7.7  –15.6  19.7  26.0  27.4 
Brazil 14.6  3.8  21.0  26.6  25.0 
Mexico  5.6 –0.6 13.7 26.2 13.6 
Central and eastern Europe
1  2.7 14.4 27.6 25.4 24.4 
Central Europe
2 6.6  4.0  17.7  18.2  19.7 
Baltic states
3  10.4 27.6 46.5 39.4 23.4 
Southeastern Europe
4  –7.8 17.6 25.7 23.8 30.9 
Other emerging
1  4.3 17.1 26.1 30.2 24.7 
Russia  3.7 26.0 21.9 36.1 34.9 
Saudi  Arabia  7.0 14.3 37.2  6.1 14.0 
South Africa  4.2  6.5  15.8  18.8  11.6 
Turkey 3.8  5.6  33.7  40.6  17.3 
1  Weighted average of the economies shown based on 2000 GDP and PPP exchange rates. For CEE, simple 
average of countries listed.    
2  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.    
3  Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania.    
4  Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and Romania.    
5  For CEE, changes from 1994–99 except 
for Romania and Serbia (1997–99). 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
Countries with more flexible exchange rates, often complemented by inflation targeting 
regimes, have in some cases reduced interest rates in an effort to discourage capital 
inflows (see Niedermayer and Barta (2008)). In practice, this policy option has been limited 
by concerns about undermining the inflation target. Another constraint has been the adverse 
implication of low interest rates for credit growth – the resulting credit expansion could not 
only fuel inflation pressures, but also lead to other financial imbalances. 
Fiscal tightening has not been actively used in response to capital inflows in countries with 
more flexible exchange rates: in fact, real government expenditure growth accelerated over 
the past few years, especially in Latin America and central and eastern Europe (IMF 
(2007a)). However, in countries operating fixed exchange rate regimes (including currency 
board arrangements), fiscal tightening has of necessity been the main policy tool to mitigate 
the macroeconomic consequences of large capital inflows. Several commodity-exporting 
countries have also relied on fiscal consolidation to curb appreciation pressures and capital 
inflows. For example, in Chile public spending increases have followed a fiscal rule which 
targets a structural fiscal surplus and requires that all surplus funds (which can be substantial 
when copper prices are high) be invested abroad. Similarly, several oil-exporting countries 
have relied on oil stabilisation funds to cope with rising oil revenues.  BIS Papers No 44  35
 
 
Available evidence indicates that public expenditure restraint during periods of strong inflows 
has contributed to both lower real exchange rate appreciation and higher long-term growth 
(Ötker-Robe et al (2007)). One should note, however, that tighter fiscal policy may produce 
two opposing effects on the exchange rate. On the one hand, as aggregate demand slows in 
response to fiscal consolidation, interest rates could fall, which would discourage capital 
inflows. On the other hand, in countries where the fundamentals are not particularly strong, 
fiscal tightening might reduce country risk premia, thus strengthening the currency and 
attracting further capital inflows. 
Finally, most emerging market countries relaxed controls on capital inflows as well as 
outflows. For example, China, India and Russia further liberalised their rules on residents’ 
investment in foreign securities in 2006 and 2007. The recent surge in China’s private sector 
investments in foreign debt securities discussed in Section 1 appears to be partly related to 
this move. CEE countries have relaxed capital controls the most, with larger Asian emerging 
economies remaining relatively restrictive, and Latin America maintaining capital controls at 
more or less unchanged levels since the mid-1990s (IMF (2007a)). 
Responses to the financial stability challenges of capital flows 
After the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, national authorities and international financial 
institutions distilled a number of lessons for banks and supervisors in home and host 
countries (see eg Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001)). The resulting 
improvements in banking supervision and prudential regulation have since helped strengthen 
the capacity of most emerging market economies to address some key structural 
weaknesses. These included poor lending standards, inadequate risk management systems, 
weak capital bases, ineffective bank governance, poor supervisory and reporting 
frameworks, and ineffective licensing, competition and bankruptcy arrangements. This 
process of improvement has been gradual in Asia, but rather more rapid in central and 
eastern Europe as a result of harmonisation with EU legislation during EU accession.  
Most countries also took steps to promote the development of their financial markets and 
increased the range of market-based instruments to deal with the inflows. In addition, many 
countries used a variety of public debt management measures to cope with the implications 
of the inflows for the liquidity in the financial system.
11 
Reflecting these structural reforms, most emerging market banking systems today exhibit 
fairly robust financial soundness indicators.
12 However, responding to the challenges of the 
recent wave of capital inflows has required new policy approaches, which in some cases 
have yet to be fully implemented.  
The potential for underestimation of a build-up in credit risk has been addressed through 
policies that strengthen oversight of banks’ management of credit risk. In Asia and central 
Europe, for instance, a number of specific supervisory and prudential measures have helped 
improve banks’ capacity to evaluate credit risk.
13 
 
                                                  
11   These measures included shifting from foreign to domestic borrowing sources, buying back outstanding Brady 
discount bonds, using the inflows to “over-borrow” and move to medium and long-term domestic borrowing, 
and using part of the privatisation receipts to repay international financial organisations. 
12  Notable exceptions are some large emerging market countries, where inefficient – though not necessarily 
unsound – state-owned institutions still dominate the commercial banking landscape. 
13   Details of these measures can be found in Ötker-Robe et al (2007) and Borio and Shim (2007), as well as in 
financial stability reports and banking supervision reports of CEE central banks published during 2005–07; see 
also the financial stability reports of the Austrian National Bank and Sveriges Riksbank. 36  BIS Papers No 44 
 
 
•  Closer monitoring and enforcement of provisioning and loan evaluation needs, 
aimed at ensuring that banks hold sufficient regulatory capital consistent with the 
underlying risks (including in CEE indirect credit risk from foreign currency lending to 
unhedged borrowers). Adequate provisioning for expected losses is also expected 
to contribute to more accurate (and presumably lower) parent bank ROE 
projections, discouraging overambitious credit expansion plans. 
•  Improving the quality of creditor information in response to signs of an unsustainable 
build-up in credit risk. Specific measures include requiring corporate borrowers to 
provide accurate financial reports; extending the credit registry to cover households 
as well as corporations; and tightening various limits on debt-to-income and/or debt 
service-to-income ratios for households, eg by requiring banks to use household 
debt and income data that are more reliable (eg based on personal income tax 
returns). Better data on borrowers’ and guarantors’ debt, debt repayment and 
income facilitate a more realistic assessment of credit risk, while the improvement in 
parent bank risk measurement helps reduce the scope for subsidiaries to 
underprovision in order to report higher ROE. 
The potential for volatility in bank-intermediated capital inflows has been addressed in 
the first place through regulatory measures to diversify funding sources and to foster a shift 
from foreign (or foreign exchange) financing to local (or domestic currency) financing of credit 
growth. Such measures have been justified by the failure of foreign bank groups to fully 
internalise the risks associated with reliance on cross-border funding of foreign currency 
loans in host countries. As noted above, this failure reflects the fact that foreign banks’ 
exposure to these countries represents a small share of their overall exposure. 
In addition, measures aimed at reducing the segmentation in financial institutions’ balance 
sheets are being considered in some countries. One proposal is to relax tight limits on 
maturity and currency mismatches and adopt instead a capital charge for market and other 
risks that arise from such mismatches. Tight limits on maturity and currency mismatches are 
sometimes seen as unnecessary because they force banks to be highly liquid by holding 
substantial excess reserves and deposits abroad, despite their access to liquidity from their 
parents. This may lead banks to rely on foreign funding of credit, which may unintentionally 
contribute to external vulnerabilities. Replacing these limits with capital charges provides 
banks with a buffer against the risks of maturity and currency mismatches, and an incentive 
to limit them. It also gives foreign banks more flexibility to rely on local funding.  
Going in the same direction is a proposal to allow banks to treat a proportion of sight and 
savings deposits that are statistically very stable as “core deposits”. Through such “mapping” 
banks obtain an alternative source of funding medium- and long-term loans, which can be 
cheaper than the cost of foreign funding. The recent failure of the UK bank Northern Rock 
provides, however, a cautionary lesson on the difficulty of calibrating such regulations.  
In addition to these measures, several countries in Latin America and CEE have retained the 
possibility of imposing new capital controls under their foreign exchange laws, although 
they have not done so in practice. The countries in general fear that such measures would 
be considered a significant step back in their economic development and liberalisation 
process, and would be largely circumvented. The Israeli authorities, for instance, considered 
Chilean-type capital controls on various occasions, but eventually ruled them out in order to 
avoid policy reversals that could damage their credibility (Eckstein and Ramot-Nyska (2008)). 
Similarly, the authorities in Turkey have resisted the use of capital or credit controls given 
their EU aspirations and the realisation that controls would be easily circumvented in the 
presence of a significant offshore market for the lira (Yörükoğlu and Çufadar (2008)).These 
fears have been partly justified by the negative experience of Thailand, which in March 2008 




The importance of cross-border banking flows has also required closer cooperation 
between home and host country supervisors. Supervisory authorities have long been 
aware of the regulatory challenges associated with banks’ foreign establishments (see 
Chopra (2007) and Turner (2008)). In 1975, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
set out for the first time a series of principles and standards to establish effective prudential 
supervision of cross-border banking activities, which are commonly referred to as the Basel 
Concordat. These principles were subsequently updated and elaborated on several 
occasions (see Song (2004)). A key objective of these principles is to ensure that no activity 
of internationally active banks escapes effective supervision and that coordinated remedial 
action can be taken when necessary. Nevertheless, on several issues a consensus on the 
best approach is yet to be achieved, and even where there is consensus implementation can 
be complex. For example, the Concordat has not sought to establish an international 
framework for the cross-border coordination of intervention to respond to bank distress.  
The fundamental problem is the mismatch between the international scope of banking 
institutions and the national scope of frameworks for banking supervision and crisis 
management. A particular dimension of this problem is the conflict between macroeconomic 
and financial stability concerns in small countries hosting large global banks, and 
microeconomic concerns for safety and soundness of parent banks in their home countries. 
For instance, host authorities may be concerned about boom-bust cycles in domestic asset 
prices, or about more general demand and external balance pressures resulting from rapid 
credit growth, and may find it difficult to address these concerns with the policy tools 
available. Host country authorities may also be uncertain how well foreign banks are 
managing risks in local markets, especially if these markets are very competitive, which is 
often the case in the initial phase of financial liberalisation. In other words, the authorities that 
bear most of the financial instability risks may not be the ones in the best position to mitigate 
them. These problems are complicated by the institutional responsibilities that have evolved 
in many countries, with the central bank primarily responsible for financial stability and 
macroeconomic policies, while a financial supervisory authority is concerned with the safety 
and soundness of financial institutions. 
Not surprisingly, progress in resolving these conflicts has been slow. On the EME domestic 
side, judging by reports of the Financial Stability Assessment Programme of the IMF and the 
World Bank, much has been done to upgrade the knowledge and skills of the supervisory 
authorities. This includes their capacity to acquire and analyse information on the use of 
complex financial products by foreign and domestic banks. 
A more difficult challenge has been to develop mechanisms to monitor effectively the 
operations of large international and regional banks that operate across different 
jurisdictions. The basis for memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between banking 
supervisory authorities in different countries was elaborated by the Basel Committee in a 
2001 document on Essential elements of a statement of cooperation between banking 
supervisors, and updated in a 2006 document on Home-host information sharing for effective 
Basel II implementation. The MoUs have helped establish a large number of bilateral 
relationships, but are not legally binding. And although they seem to be working well to 
strengthen cooperation, they have not yet been tested in a distress situation. In particular, 
Bollard (2004) pointed out that MoUs created too much uncertainty to be useful in a crisis. 
Moreover, they could in the end prove to be of little practical help because of barriers to the 
exchange of information that arise due to political, legal or tax-related issues.  
Accordingly, some countries – most notably New Zealand – have required systemically 
important banks to be incorporated in the country. This policy has three main objectives (see 
Bollard (2004)). First, it provides a higher degree of certainty over the balance sheet of the 
bank, enabling more efficient resolution in the event of distress or failure. Second, local 
incorporation enables the imposition of minimum capital requirements and risk limits, and 38  BIS Papers No 44 
 
 
provides some separation between the subsidiary and parent, thus reducing intragroup 
contagion risk. Furthermore, it makes it more difficult, legally and practically, for assets to be 
removed from the local operation to the parent bank (which is not the case for a branch). 
Third, local incorporation establishes a basis for sound bank governance in the host country, 
including a board of directors with responsibility to act in the interests of the local bank. 
Cooperation between supervisors at the moment seems to go farthest in central and 
southeastern Europe and the Nordic-Baltic region. As noted above, by lending in foreign 
currencies, either directly or through their subsidiaries in emerging market countries, foreign 
banks avoid a direct mismatch on their balance sheets. But such borrowing does create a 
credit risk when directed to borrowers without foreign currency assets or earnings. 
Recognising this risk, home country banks from Austria and Nordic countries and their 
supervisors have started to monitor whether such exposures are being taken into account. 
One approach has been regular cooperation at the working level, irrespective of MoUs, to 
foster the exchange of information and analysis between home and host supervisors (see 
Austrian National Bank (2007a) and Wajid et al (2007)).  
In addition, joint inspections of host country banks are reportedly being increasingly 
organised. Separately, home country supervisors have developed special tools for analysing 
the exposures of their banking groups (Würz (2006)). Another approach, still under 
consideration, would be the calibration of prudential tools at the disposal of the home 
supervisors. This approach would entail, inter alia, the incorporation of macroeconomic risks 
in the assessment of the appropriateness of regulatory cushions corresponding to exposures 
in host country credit markets.  
The most difficult issue relates to resolution and associated questions, such as: What would 
happen if a foreign-owned subsidiary or branch that was systemically important locally ran 
into problems? Is there adequate clarity on key issues and responsibilities to ensure that the 
central bank and supervisory authorities in the host country deal transparently with the 
evaporation of liquidity and disruptions to the payment system in such a case? Work on 
these issues has only just begun (see Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2006), Ingves (2006), 
Srejber (2006)), and it will be important to involve in it all major stakeholders from both home 
and host countries.  
In this context, the incentive effects flowing from crisis resolution arrangements play a key 
role. As pointed out by Rosengren (2006), during times of acute problems, politicians often 
seek to use financial institutions to mitigate the impact of the crisis on depositors, borrowers 
or investors. This results in the host supervisor having different incentives from the parent, 
and often from the home supervisor. The primary concern of the home supervisor is to 
prevent a situation where problems from the subsidiary bring into question the solvency of 
the entire firm. In the host country, the concern is not only to find ways to mitigate immediate 
liquidity and solvency problems at the troubled subsidiary, but also to maintain overall 
lending and capital inflows to the country. From the perspective of financial integration, it is 
interesting to note that these incentive problems seem to be recognised most clearly in 
countries which are at the same time important home and host to financial institutions, as is 
currently the case in Austria, Benelux, Hong Kong SAR, Scandinavia, Singapore and, more 





Gross private capital inflows to emerging market economies 
In billions of US dollars 
Annual averages   
1990–97 2002–06 
2005 2006 2007 
Emerging market economies
1       
Total  inflows  210 456 599 824  1,347 
Direct  investment  81 220 270 332 400 
Portfolio investment  70  94  127  164  432 
Equity  24 54 71 95  193 
Debt  47 40 57 69  239 
Other  investment  60 142 202 328 515 
Banks 27  67  77  176  231 
Other sectors  33  75  124  152  284 
Memo: Current account balance  –58  252  349  453  507 
Change in reserves
 2  –54 –382 –470 –603  –1,040 
Official  inflows  –20 –24 –28 –45  … 
Asia
3       
Total  inflows  102 221 270 375 681 
Direct  investment  46 106 130 145 154 
Portfolio  investment  20 55 66 90  350 
Equity  10 38 46 60 … 
Debt  11 17 20 30 … 
Other investment  36  61  74  140  177 
Banks  16 30 21 88 … 
Other  sectors  20 31 53 51 … 
Memo: Current account balance  –13  170  202  319  445 
Change in reserves
 2  –34 –247 –264 –353 –641 
Official  inflows  4 –5 –5 –2 … 
Latin America
4       
Total inflows  77  54  82  102  194 
Direct  investment  25 53 63 60 86 
Portfolio investment  40  5  20  16  50 
Equity 12  6  12  11  … 
Debt 28  –1  8  5  … 
Other  investment  12 –4 –1 26 58 
Banks  6 –4 –4 –5 … 
Other sectors  7  0  3  31  … 
Memo: Current account balance  –32  23  39  49  24 
Change in reserves
2  –13 –24 –27 –44  –126 
Official  inflows  –16 –4 –6 –5 … 
Central and eastern Europe
5       
Total  inflows  19 116 153 211 214 
Direct  investment  7 46 57 94 85 
Portfolio  investment  4 24 36 27  0 
Equity  1 3 5 3  … 
Debt  3 22 31 24 … 
Other  investment  8 46 60 91  130 
Banks  3 23 34 43 … 
Other  sectors  5 22 27 48 … 
Memo: Current account balance  –6  –51  –57  –88  –119 
Change in reserves
2  –7 –21 –45 –23 –37 
Official  inflows  –4 –2 –5 –3 … 
“Other sectors” is comprised of non-financial corporations (private, public and quasi-corporations), insurance companies, 
pension funds, other non-depository financial intermediaries, private non-profit institutions and households. 
1    Comprises the regions below plus Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.       
2    A minus sign indicates an 
increase.    
3  China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.    
4  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.       
5    Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey.  




Gross private capital outflows from emerging market economies 
In billions of US dollars 
Annual averages   
1990–97 2002–06 




     
Total  outflows  76 327 435 681 830 
Direct investment  16  68  71  157  182 
Portfolio  investment  17 118 159 283 400 
Equity  8 25 28 48 69 
Debt  9  93 131 235 331 
Other  investment  40 143 212 251 248 
Banks 20  44  73  116  124 
Other  sectors  17  99 140 135 124 
Memo: Official outflows  0  –3  –6  2  … 
Asia       
Total  outflows  51 139 177 316 502 
Direct  investment  10 26 30 54 77 
Portfolio investment  9  57  58  166  335 
Equity 6  15  17  31  … 
Debt 3  42  42  135  … 
Other  investment  29 58 97  105 90 
Banks 13  21  44  47  … 
Other sectors  13  38  53  59  … 
Memo: Official outflows  1  1  0  2  … 
Latin America       
Total outflows  17  46  53  102  105 
Direct  investment  3 18 18 42 20 
Portfolio investment  5  9  9  21  16 
Equity  1 5 6 6  … 
Debt 4  4  4  15  … 
Other  investment  8 19 25 39 68 
Banks 4  2  9  11  … 
Other sectors  4  17  16  28  … 
Memo: Official outflows  0  3  6  0  … 
Central and eastern Europe       
Total  outflows  5 37 36 86 54 
Direct investment  0  10  9  31  15 
Portfolio  investment  1 11 13 21 12 
Equity  0 4 5 9  … 
Debt 1  8  9  12  … 
Other  investment  4 16 14 34 28 
Banks 3  8  7  19  … 
Other sectors  1  8  7  15  … 
Memo: Official outflows  –1  –1  –1  –1  … 
“Other sectors” is comprised of non-financial corporations (private, public and quasi-corporations), insurance 
companies, pension funds, other non-depository financial intermediaries, private non-profit institutions and 
households. 
1  Comprises the regions below plus Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.    
2  A minus sign indicates an 
increase.    
3  China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.    
4  Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.       
5    Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey. 




Net inflows of private capital to emerging market economies
1 








       
Total flows  146  198  252  232  605 
Direct investment  74  206  260  250  310 
Portfolio  investment  42  –48 –19  –104 49 
Other investment  31  25  13  86  249 
Memo: Current account 
balance –75  375  517  698  738 
Change in reserves
2  –64 –483  –595  –753  –1,236 
Official flows  12  –86  –110  –160  –149 
Asia         
Total flows  58  72  91  48  194 
Direct  investment  36  80 104  97 91 
Portfolio investment  14  –39  –9  –111  18 
Other investment  10  33  –4  61  85 
Memo: Current account 
balance –10  213  235  360  486 
Change in reserves
2  –36 –279  –288  –372  –669 
Official flows  3  –14  –21  –23  –38 
Latin America         
Total flows  50  19  37  10  100 
Direct investment  23  42  51  28  77 
Portfolio investment  31  –5  5  –14  32 
Other  investment  –4  –18 –20  –4 –9 
Memo: Current account 
balance –37  18  35  45  16 
Change in reserves
2  –14 –27  –33  –50  –133 
Official flows  3  –7  –31  –19  1 
Central and eastern Europe         
Total flows  12  84  118  120  171 
Direct investment  7  39  52  65  73 
Portfolio investment  4  12  22  10  –7 
Other investment  1  31  45  46  104 
Memo: Current account 
balance –7  –54  –61  –91  –122 
Change in reserves
2  –6 –23  –46  –23  –43 
Official flows  1  –7  –8  –5  –3 
1  This table has broader country coverage than Appendix Tables A1 and A2. In particular, it also includes 
Africa, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle East.    
2  A minus sign indicates an increase. 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook. 




Sovereign wealth funds of emerging market economies 









United Arab Emirates  Abu Dhabi Investment Council  650  1976  Oil 
Singapore   Government Investment Corporation 350  1981  Other 
China   China Investment Corporation  200  2003  Other 
Kuwait  Future Generation Fund  174  1976  Oil 
Singapore   Temasek Holdings
2 168  1974  Other 
Hong Kong SAR  Investment Portfolio (HKMA)  140  1998  Other 
Russia   Reserve Fund  130  2008/2004  Oil 
Qatar  Qatar Investment Authority  60  2005  Oil 
Libya  Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Co  50  1981  Oil 
Algeria  Fonds de Régulation des Recettes  43  2000  Oil, gas 
Kuwait  General Reserve Fund  39  1960  Oil 
Russia   National Wealth Fund  33  2008/2004  Oil 
Brunei  Brunei Investment Authority  30  1983  Oil 
Kazakhstan  National Oil Fund
2   25  2000  Oil, gas 
Korea  Korea Investment Corporation  20  2005  Other 
Dubai  Investment Corporation of Dubai  19  2006  Other 
Venezuela  National Development Fund/FIEM   18  2006/1998  Oil 
Malaysia   Khazanah Nasional BHD  18  1993  Other 
Chile  Economic and Social Stabilisation 







Iran  Oil Stabilisation Fund  13  1999  Oil 
Nigeria  Excess Crude Account  11  2004  Oil 
Botswana Pula  Fund  7  1966  Diamonds 
Oman  State General Reserve Fund  6  1980  Oil 
Saudi Arabia  Public Investment Fund  5  2008  Oil 
Mexico   Oil Income Stabilisation Fund  3  2000  Oil 
Bahrain  Mumtalakat Holding Company  3  2006  Oil 
Azerbaijan  State Oil Fund  2  1999  Oil 
Timor Leste  Petroleum Fund  2  2005  Oil 
Total
3, 4     ≈2,250      
1  Estimates based on official sources and references cited in Mihaljek (2008); end-2007 or the most recent 
date available (up to May 2008).    
2  A portion of holdings is in domestic assets or is intended for domestic 
investment.    
3  The total uses the midpoint of the range of estimates for the United Arab Emirates.  
Sources: IMF; Deutsche Bank; Morgan Stanley; Standard Chartered; SWF Institute; national data; author’s 
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